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Comparative Institutional Law and Economics:  
Reclaiming Economics for Socio-Legal Research 
 
 
Law and economics is an eclectic field. Lawyer-economists compare it to a marketplace of 
ideas to which competing schools of thought, themselves not homogeneous, bring an 
astonishing variety of perspectives.1 Indeed, from the early 1980s the hegemony of the 
dominant until then Chicago law and economics has been undermined by the rise of new 
approaches, critical of neoclassical economics.2 Law and economics has branched out. Besides 
Chicago Law and Economics, the most comprehensive overview of the field discerns Public 
Choice Theory, Institutional Law and Economics, New Institutional Economics, New Haven 
school, Modern Civic Republican and Austrian approaches to law and economics.3 In addition, 
Behavioural Law and Economics took off during the 1990s. Each of these discordant 
viewpoints defines itself partly in opposition to the Chicago style law and economics and aims 
to correct some of its assumptions. Some see the absence of a distilled straightforward method 
for applying economic principles to legal institutions as an obstacle to convincing lawyers and 
judges in the trustworthiness and potential of the discipline.4 Others view this cacophony of 
voices as a strength pointing that legal-economic issues are too complex to be resolved by one 
singular approach.5 Still others emphasize that the question is rather which approach is best 
suited to address a particular problem.6  
 
Yet, this is a conversation among insiders. The great reliance on mathematical theory in law 
and economics has made it increasingly difficult for legal scholars to cross the boundaries of 
the discipline,7 turning the question “Law and economics of what stripe?” into a secondary one. 
Paradoxically, this works toward maintaining the popularity of Chicago-style contributions 
which are not too technical. The first point of entry for anyone interested to learn the basic 
concepts are introductory accounts such as Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law (already in its 
9th edition)8 or Polinsky’s “An Introduction to Law and Economics” which present the 
mainstream.9 Their great attraction is that they are user-friendly. The most important alternative 
to Posner’s textbook, Cooter and Ulen’s Law and Economics,10 aims to be more balanced and 
                                                 
1 Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law. From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond 
(Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006) 59; Megan Richardson, ‘The Second Wave 
in Context ’ in Megan Richardson and Gillian Hadfield (eds), The Second Wave of Law and Economics (First edn, 
Leichhardt, NSW: The Federation Press 1999) 2. 
2 Ejan Mackaay, ‘History of Law and Economics (0200)’ in Gerrit De Geest and Boudewijn Bouckaert (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol I (First edn, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2000) 
<https://reference.findlaw.com/lawandeconomics/0200-history-of-law-and-economics.pdf> 80. 
3 Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law. From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond 
(Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006). 
4 Ejan Mackaay, ‘History of Law and Economics (0200)’ in Gerrit De Geest and Boudewijn Bouckaert (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol I (First edn, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2000) 
<https://reference.findlaw.com/lawandeconomics/0200-history-of-law-and-economics.pdf>  80, 93. 
5 Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law. From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond 
(Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006) 341. 
6 Megan Richardson, ‘The Second Wave in Context ’ in Megan Richardson and Gillian Hadfield (eds), The Second 
Wave of Law and Economics (First edn, Leichhardt, NSW: The Federation Press 1999) 2. 
7 62.6% of the authors who published in the Journal of Legal Studies between 2004 and 2010 are economists as 
opposed to only 27.5% of legal scholars. Theodore Eisenberg, ‘The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical 
Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns’ [2011] University of Illinois Law Review 1713, 1723. George Hay, 
‘The Past, Present and Future of Law and Economics’ (1996) 3 Agenda 71, 78. 
8 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Ninth edn, Wolters Kluwer 2014). 
9 A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (Third edn, New York: Aspen Publishers 2003). 
10 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (Sixth edn, Boston: Pearson Education, Inc. 2012). 
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pays tribute to behavioural economics and social norms, but due to its introductory nature, again 
does not really draw a picture of debate and competition but of a rather cohesive field in which 
the strict neoclassical paradigm remains largely unchallenged. The degree of mathematical 
sophistication needed to progress in the discipline also puts off many early career researchers 
who find the methodological language of socio-legal studies much more accessible. 
Consequently, for many outsiders (or somewhat outsiders), law and economics still implies 
primarily the Chicago approach and its early leading proponent Judge Posner.  
 
The sad result of all this is the divide that has developed between law and economics and socio-
legal studies. While both movements hold an instrumental conception of law, they operate 
largely in isolation from one another.11 Today law and economics and socio-legal studies are 
viewed as alternative career paths. It is indicative that when re-structuring its methodological 
course the research institution in which I pursued my own PhD studies separated first-year PhD 
students into two streams: lawyer-economists and socio-legal.  
 
In view of socio-legal scholars the divide rests on irreconcilable methodological differences. In 
their eyes, law and economics rationalizes or rather reduces complex legal institutions to a few 
fundamental economic principles and then restructures these institutions according to 
efficiency. A body of universal, immutable axioms that provide guidance for legal decision-
making and to which all law must conform, economics has been dubbed by some the “modern 
natural law”.12 Others argue that laying out the abstract principles of microeconomic theory 
(among them efficiency), applying them deductively to any area of law and advocating 
decision-making that enhances efficiency, the Chicago approach to law and economics 
represents nothing but new formalism.13 .What is common  between these two views is that 
both see the legal-economic analysis as removing law from any context. Law is reduced to a 
product of the quasi-natural economic forces of supply and demand that exist beyond time and 
space. The concern, thus, is that disregarding the facts of life and the environment in which 
legal institutions are embedded, law and economics generates unworkable universal solutions. 
This has led many legal scholars to eschew the economic instrumentarium altogether. 
  
While not without basis, the criticisms have largely resulted from a hasty and superficial 
engagement of the two disciplines peddled by the traditional Chicago approach.  It is this 
version of law and economics that is characterized by complacency and universalism; yet it 
does not exhaust this diverse and fast-developing field. The purpose of this article is not, 
however, to classify the different schools of thought populating law and economics today.14 
The main argument is rather that sophisticated economic analysis requires infusing the concept 
of efficiency with context by applying the comparative law and economics method. Combining 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Comparative Law, this innovative interdisciplinary 
methodology is able to overcome the shortcomings of each of the disciplines taken separately 
and inject the field of law and economics with new analytical power. I propose the development 
of a Comparative Institutional Law and Economics approach which, I argue, enables subtle 
legal-economic analysis that is grounded in social reality. My argument develops as follows. I 
                                                 
11 In this sense see also John Donohue, ‘Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken’ (1988) 22 Law and Society 
Review 903, 903-906; Theodore Eisenberg, ‘The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a 
Response to Concerns’ [2011] University of Illinois Law Review 1713, 1719. 
12 Michael Feeley, ‘Three Voices of Socio-Legal Studies’ (2001) 35 Israel Law Review 175, 193-194. 
13 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New 
Legal Theory?’ (2009) 95 Cornell Law Review 61, 95-99. To be fair Gregory Shaffer recognises that there is more 
to law and economics than the Chicago school of thought. 
14 In this respect, see Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law. From Posner to Post-
Modernism and Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006). 
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shall first expose the universalist nature of the Chicago style law and economics.  Second, I will 
argue that NIE rescues the concept of efficiency from the grip of the universalistic law and 
economics as it does not suffer from three major deficiencies that pervade the Posnerian 
analysis. Third, I will focus on the ability of comparative law to further contextualize the 
concept of efficiency and at the same time bridge the different legal traditions. 
 
A. Some Preliminary Observations 
 
Describing an opponent always entails the risk of caricaturing him and some may argue that the 
below account of the Chicago approach is simplified and one-sided. Others may point that there 
is not always such a sharp dividing line between Chicago and NIE. Indeed, the contours of the 
various approaches to law and economics often seem fuzzy. That there are different factions 
even within each school of thought and that each school evolves (including under the pressure 
of competing perspectives) further complicates the picture. On one hand, despite criticizing the 
assumptions of neoclassical microeconomics, new institutional economists do not completely 
negate its framework and aim to distance themselves from the “old” Institutional Economics.15 
On the other hand, new law and economics literature that blurs the lines of NIE has developed 
as it picks up on some of NIE’s core issues such as incomplete and long-term contracts but has 
its roots in mathematical contract theory.16 Today some Chicago Law School scholars promote 
the view of bounded rationality17 and even Posner himself has partially moved away from his 
early claims18 although his thesis about the efficiency of common law does not appear to be 
substantially changed in the last edition of his book.19 Paying tribute to every single faction, 
however, would muddle the comparison. For this reason, the article contrasts the poles in the 
two approaches: the traditional Posnerian view and the core ideas of NIE as promoted by its 
founding fathers – Coase,20 Williamson, North.  I admit that I use this rhetorical device to make 
the differences clear. But although I realize that there are mainstream scholars who might 
escape some of the criticisms, I contend that the differences outlined below still distinguish NIE 
from the mainstream paradigm. 
 
B. Universality of Law and Economics 
 
To this day legal scholars who are not themselves doing law and economics associate the 
economic ingredient of the discipline predominantly with the Chicago school of thought. In a 
way this is not surprising. It is the University of Chicago where it all started and it was 
Chicagoans that extended the application of law and economics to all areas of life.21 In addition, 
                                                 
15 Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (First edn, New York: Oxford University Press 1996) 3, 6-
10; Ronald Coase, ‘The New Institutional Economics’ (1998) 88 The American Economic Review 72. 
16 Robert Scott and George Triantis, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design’ (2005) 56 Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 187; Richard Craswell, ‘The "Incomplete Contracts" Literature and Efficient 
Precautions’ (2005) 56 Case Western Reserve Law Review 151; Steven Shavell, ‘Contractual Holdup and Legal 
Intervention’ (2007) 36 Journal of Legal Studies 325. 
17 Richard Epstein, ‘The Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules’ in Cristoph Engel and Gerd Gigerenzer (eds), 
Heuristics and the Law (Fist edn, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2006). 
18 Richard Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press 1990) 31, 
387 (“this book modifies some of my previously published views” and “we should be cautious in pushing wealth 
maximization”). 
19 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Ninth edn, Wolters Kluwer 2014). 
20 Coase was a central figure at the Chicago Law School. Nevertheless, his insistence on engaging with the positive-
transaction-cost world makes him also instrumental to the genesis of NIE. Coase’s transaction cost approach is 
further developed by Williamson and today is at the heart of NIE. On Coase see also infra footnote 38. 
21 For example, the Nobel Prize laureate Garry Becker applies economic analysis to family relations. For a short 
history of Chicago law and economics, see Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law. 
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the elegance and precision of Chicagoan models makes them attractive to policy-makers who 
naturally prefer clear-cut predictions and recommendations. The major contribution of the 
Chicago school is that it developed a systematic way of thinking of law reform that entails a 
steady application of a coherent body of economic theory (price theory) to legal rules. Where 
legal rules constitute prices of illegal conduct, they produce incentives to which rational 
individuals respond. Increase in the price, be it by providing for higher damages in case of 
tortious acts or breach of contract, or for heavier fines and longer jail time in case of criminal 
activity, would make illegal conduct more costly and incentivize actors to reduce it.22 
Structuring, then, legal rules in terms of the incentives they induce, we are able to affect human 
behavior in a way that would produce the desired result.23 This is the logic that is at the heart 
of the Chicago approach to law and economics. It will not be an overstatement to say that by 
methodically cultivating it, Chicagoans raised awareness about the consequences and trade-offs 
that follow from policy choices and opened the door to a better understanding of the relationship 
between the legal options available and the outcomes sought. 
 
Yet, while having attracted a large following, Chicago style law and economics, has also drawn 
a great deal of criticism. Neoclassical economists view themselves as equipped with universal 
analytical tools that could be applied to any field.24 But while studying the phenomenon that 
has piqued their interest, they detach it from the particular background in which it operates. The 
concrete legal institution explored is largely isolated from the legal and social framework in 
which it is applied and is, instead, set in the theoretical construct of a perfectly competitive 
market. The latter inevitably comes with its basic and overly strong assumptions of well-defined 
rights and their complete enforcement as well as with an extreme focus on decentralized 
decision-making. The very emergence, the nature and the process of development of the rights’ 
structure is disregarded. If, after all, an important characteristic of the institutional context 
cannot be ignored, it is always positioned as an exogenous factor. As a result, the way the 
studied legal institution fits and interacts with others within the working of the larger system 
remains generally hidden from view. As for transaction costs, they are conventionally assumed 
to be zero. Even if they are introduced in the model, this is done only in a rudimentary fashion, 
without disciplined accounting for their source or nature. It is sufficient to look at the 
neoclassical models concerning contractual damages in which transaction costs are assumed 
only for the purpose of excluding renegotiation to realize that another vehicle through which 
particularities can enter the picture is completely underrated. With all possible complications 
tucked away, it comes as no surprise that neoclassical law and economics is capable of making 
bold claims regarding the universality of its solutions. 
 
In fairness, the mentioned features of neoclassical economic analysis of law should not be 
blamed only on the economics side of the discipline. The legal scholars who embraced law and 
economics did little to question the initial assumptions with which economists approached law. 
Usually US-trained, they directed their attention to the legal system they knew best and thus, 
showing no comparative interest, brought in tacit positivist postulates viewing law as a coherent 
product of one state and not as the messy social phenomenon it is. Such an implicit positivist 
                                                 
From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 
2006) 94-102. 
22 Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law. From Posner to Post-Modernism and 
Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006) 104. 
23 Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law. From Posner to Post-Modernism and 
Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006) 104, 33. 
24 Law is hardly the only discipline that has seen the penetration of economic analysis. In political science, for 
example, economic analysis has been applied to non-market political decision-making to produce public choice 
theory. 
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outlook is underlain by the same assumption of fully defined rights and their enforcement 
without transaction cost limitations which is so typical of perfectly competitive markets.25 
Unspoken remnants of the positivist paradigm also positioned the American common law 
process as a naturally presumed setting, a setting that matched extremely well with the 
economic emphasis on decentralized decision-making. Thus, tacit legal assumptions, rooted in 
legal positivism, only reinforced the rigidities of economic theory. They have also fueled its 
universalist ambitions. Failing to recognize the silent incorporation of local factors in the 
analysis, American law-and-economics scholars readily export US solutions to other legal 
systems. In this way, the universalism of economics stemming from the creation of an ideal, 
yet virtual reality is amplified by the American epistemic imperialism that originates from 
subconsciously operating positivist traces. 
 
This is not to say that neoclassical economic models are useless. On the contrary, they represent 
important analytical and educational tools which provide essential information how behavioral 
incentives are affected by legal institutions and what are the trade-offs between stimulating one 
incentive or another. My own research has devoted a great deal of time and effort to studying 
the effects generated by contractual damages and the way economists adapt this knowledge to 
other contractual remedies. Yet, my point is that the capacity of neoclassical economic models 
to evaluate legal institutions in terms of their incentive effects is also the outer limit of their 
universal claim. Once this limit is reached it is necessary to step into the real world since further 
insight can be gained only by examining the imperfect environment and its particularities.  
 
It is by no means mandatory that economic analysis be based on neoclassical economics. 
Neither is it inevitable that the analysis is affected by residual positivist biases deeply ingrained 
in legal thinking. Thus, I advocate the employment of a comparative law and economics method 
which joins New Institutional Economics and Comparative Law. I shall focus on the economic 
element first, and turn to the legal side in the section that follows.  
 
C. New Institutional Economics 
 
Three differences between the Chicago tradition and NIE speak in favour of the latter school 
when applying economic analysis to law: first, the degree of realism achieved by economic 
analysis; second, the more subtle position taken with regard to the deregulation/regulation 
debate; and third, its developed dynamic framework.26  These methodological differences turn 
out to be significant as they lead to a different understanding of efficiency and to the specific 
outlook comparative law and economics has on the standard. 
 
1. The Degree of Realism 
 
By relying on very strict premises the Chicago approach created a sort of "economic nirvana"27 
                                                 
25 In a similar vein, see Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano, ‘Law and Economics in Retrospect’ in Éric Brousseau 
and Jean-Michel Glachant (eds), New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook (First edn, Cambridge, UK; New 
York: Cambridge University Press 2008). 
26 On the fundamental building blocks of the Chicago approach and of NIE, see Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. 
Medema, Economics and the Law. From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006) 102-126; 241-276. 
27 Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano, ‘Law and Economics in Retrospect’ in Éric Brousseau and Jean-Michel 
Glachant (eds), New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook (First edn, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press 2008). 
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which, according to Ronald Coase, has little to do "with what happens in the real world."28 In 
this approach, individuals, being rational maximisers of their satisfaction, respond, in the 
context of perfect markets, to price incentives embedded in the legal rules, the latter devised 
with an efficiency purpose. Although wealth-maximisation and the means to achieve it lie also 
at the core of NIE29 the latter has moved well beyond the neoclassical and even the post-
neoclassical paradigm. First, the introduction of the concept of transaction costs to economic 
analysis30 exposed the illusory comfort of the world in which mainstream economists lived – 
an ideal world in which there are no costs of search, negotiation, monitoring and 
enforcement.31 However this might not be the radical departure that it appears, as post-Chicago 
scholars are also increasingly aware of the importance of contracting costs and the need to take 
economic thinking beyond the idea of perfect markets.32 Second, the assumption of full 
rationality is relaxed in order to base the new institutional analysis on the concept of bounded 
rationality.33 Again, some post-Chicagoans also realise the need to integrate a more realistic 
model of behaviour in their approach.34 The true progress made by NIE, I think, is rooted in 
the way the analysis proceeds that makes it less abstract and more sensitive to the actual facts. 
It takes the concept of transaction costs seriously, viewing them not merely as barriers to 
exchange to be eliminated but as the product of particular institutional arrangements in the 
specific context which themselves need to be analyzed. 
 
Analysis always begins with the Coase theorem.35 In a world of zero transaction costs, law 
does not matter since parties will always bargain for the one efficient outcome. Our world, 
however, is a world of positive transaction costs and in it, law has important efficiency 
                                                 
28 Ronald Coase, ‘The New Institutional Economics’ (1998) 88 The American Economic Review 72, 73. For the 
debate between Coase and Oliver Williamson, on one side, and Richard Posner, on the other side, see Richard 
Posner, ‘The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics’ (1993) 149 Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics) 73; Ronald Coase, ‘Coase on Posner on 
Coase: Comment’ (1993) 149 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics) 96; Oliver Williamson, ‘Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and 
Economics’ (1993) 149 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics) 99; Richard Posner, ‘Reply’ (1993) 149 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics) 119; Ronald Coase, ‘Concluding Comment’ (1993) 149 Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics) 360. 
29 Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1; Oliver Williamson, 
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (First edn, New York: Free 
Press, London: Collier Macmillan 1985) 23. 
30 Ronald Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386; Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 
(1960) 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
31 Ronald Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (First edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988) 7. 
32 See e.g. Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual 
Obligation’ (1983) 69 Virginia Law Review 967. 
33 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behaviour (Second edn, New York: Macmillan 1961) 24. Some new institutional 
economists even strive to go beyond the concept of bounded rationality. Exploring how humans decipher the 
environment through pre-existing mental constructs, they aim at explaining the institutional choices made and the 
effect of these choices on the economy. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic 
Performance (First edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990); Douglass North, ‘Prologue’ in John 
Drobak and John V.C. Nye (eds), The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics (First edn, San Diego: 
Academic Press 1997) 11. In this aspect the new institutional economic literature intersects with experimental-
behavioural law and economics.  
34 Eric Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure’ (2003) 112 The Yale 
Law Journal 829, 865-868, 875-877. To be more correct, although Eric Posner is conscious of problems with the 
rationality assumption, he is also very sceptical of the capacity of bounded rationality models to better inform 
economic analysis of contract law. 
35 In fact, Coase himself did not explicitly state the Coase theorem. It can be induced from Ronald Coase, ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
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implications.36 In the imperfect human universe parties will bargain not until the right reaches 
its most valued user but until the expected gains exceed the expected costs. So how the 
particular right is initially assigned determines its final place. For the law to be efficient, it 
should structure property rights in a way which minimises transaction costs and maximises 
society's wealth.37 So far, so good; Chicagoans and new institutionalists would not, I think, 
disagree on this.38 But what are the concrete steps to be taken in the process of finding the 
efficient legal solutions? Here is where the most significant differences arise.  
 
The logic of the Chicago analysis proceeds roughly as follows: An optimal model is 
constructed under the assumption of zero transaction costs. The hypothetical legal rule 
enabling the parties to achieve the outcome in the optimal model is identified. The existing 
legal rule is then compared to the optimal one: if it is the same, the effective law is efficient; 
if it differs, then it is criticised as a rule that does not lead to an optimal result and, therefore, 
should be changed.39 The exercise may also include changes in the assumptions of the zero-
cost model to discern different rules that are efficient under different conditions. Then again it 
will be seen whether the real-life rule fits any of the efficient ones.40 NIE, by contrast operates 
a different method. Different real-life institutional solutions to a problem are identified. Then 
the particular institutional framework is investigated in order to discover the factors 
determining transaction costs and the types of transaction costs associated with each of the 
solutions. Further, the different institutional arrangements are compared in terms of costs. The 
appropriate institution then becomes the one that implies the lowest level of transaction costs.41  
 
Obviously, both schools aim at getting as close as possible to the zero-transaction-cost world. 
Why then is the methodological procedure of NIE to be preferred? The problem with the 
Chicago approach is the continuous, invariable emphasis on the optimal model. In the 
Chicagoan vision, the ideal world should be approximated by imitation, by replicating it as if 
it actually exists. If parties cannot reach the efficient allocation of property rights as a result of 
transaction costs, the law should help them attain the outcome as if there were no barriers to 
exchange. Costs are minimised by assuming zero costs and assigning rights and liabilities as 
if this assumption were correct. The rights go to the party that would have purchased them as 
the highest value user; the liabilities go to the party that would have assumed them as the least 
                                                 
36 It is often the case that only one of the assumptions, on which the Coase theorem rests, is emphasised – that of 
zero transaction costs (including information costs). For this reason it will be useful here to recall the other two 
assumptions which are just as important: (1) that the rights over the resources are fully defined, and (2) that the 
legal rights are alienable. Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law. From Posner to 
Post-Modernism and Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006) 110, 113. For 
more on these two assumptions, see infra the text accompanying footnotes 100-105. 
37 This is known as the Coase lesson. For a detailed proof and interpretation of the Coase theorem, see Nicholas 
Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law. From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond (Second 
edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006) 107-119. 
38 For this reason Coase is considered a founding father of both schools. It is also for this reason that Mercuro and 
Medema view NIE as being in many respects consistent with the Chicago approach. Nicholas Mercuro and Steven 
G. Medema, Economics and the Law. From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006) 243. 
39 It serves to be noted that, unlike Posner’s work, much of today’s mainstream scholarship is rather positive and 
sceptical of grand claims. See e.g. Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (Sixth edn, Boston: 
Pearson Education, Inc. 2012).  
40 For a similar description of the Chicago thinking, see Eric Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after 
Three Decades: Success or Failure’ (2003) 112 The Yale Law Journal 829, 833-834. 
41 This rough description is distilled from the methodological account in Chapter 1 Transaction Cost Economics 
of Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (First 
edn, New York: Free Press, London: Collier Macmillan 1985). 
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cost avoider.42 Yet, the assumption is not correct since no matter how much transaction costs 
are reduced, they are never completely eliminated and there will always be costs of defining 
and enforcing property rights.43 We simply cannot arrive at the ideal world by imagining we 
are actually there. 
 
New institutionalists, on the other hand, have accepted that this is unfeasible, so the emphasis 
is on where we are now, not on where we want to be. They study existing alternative 
governance institutions and aim at economising on transaction costs by endorsing the 
institution which governs exchange at the lowest cost level. Saving takes place not by 
mechanically reproducing the situation parties would be in if transaction costs were absent but 
by choosing the real-life workable arrangement that is the most cost advantageous. Moreover, 
as transaction costs depend on the particular institutional framework, the recommended 
solution is also determined with regard to the specific context. In this way, NIE moves away 
from the "economic nirvana" and adopts an analytical technique that enables more accurate 
conclusions. 
 
In other words, although neoclassical economic models are educational if one wants to view 
legal rules in instrumental terms, it is important not to forget that they are only normative 
constructions that largely assume a non-existent state of the world. Often, they leave out 
important variables either because the latter do not appear as crucial within the ideal world, or 
because the scholar is focused on coming up with clear-cut recommendations. Other, more 
sophisticated models include the relevant variables but can lead to definite conclusions only if 
there are statistical data which can be punched into the model to make it operative.44 In 
contrast, NIE investigates in detail the sources of transaction costs in particular contexts and 
attenuates the quantification difficulty by comparing the costs of diverse institutions. Instead 
of being paralysed by the absence of data on the amount of costs, it draws conclusions from 
their difference. This is how lawyers, without being too much preoccupied with computation 
problems, can make a substantial contribution in this analytical procedure as they are well-
trained to recognise the transaction costs depending on the national legal system.  
 
2. The Position in the Deregulation/Regulation Debate 
 
The Chicago school invariably insists on the necessary connection between efficiency and the 
market. If the efficient allocation of property rights can be reached by parties' contracting, the 
reasoning goes, the law should facilitate exchange by providing for maximum tradability of 
property rights at low cost. It should ensure the conditions for achieving the efficient outcome 
by excluding any restrictions on freedom of contracting and by "mimicking the market". Such 
an interpretation of the Coase theorem is easily translated into the normative recommendation 
of minimum regulation. Public regulation is viewed as an additional source of transaction 
costs, obstructing the operation of competitive markets and generated, among other things, by 
regulatory capture.45 The view of the efficiency of common law (broadly understood as judge-
                                                 
42 The same reasoning stays behind the efficient breach principle under which the promisor should be allowed to 
breach the contract if the gains from the breach exceed the costs. 
43 Steven Cheung, ‘On the New Institutional Economics’ in Steven Cheung (ed), Economic Explanations: Selected 
Papers of Steven Cheung (First edn, Hong Kong: Arcadia Press Ltd. 2005) 248-250; Robert Cooter and Thomas 
Ulen, Law and Economics (Fifth edn, Pearson/Addison-Wesley 2008) 94; Robert Cooter, ‘The Cost of Coase’ 
(1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 1, 11. 
44 See in this sense Eric Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure’ 
(2003) 112 The Yale Law Journal 829. 
45 George Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 3. 
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made law) also contributes to this prescription.46 According to Posner, the common law 
incentivises players to "channel their transactions through the market" or, in case of high 
transaction costs, simply reproduces the outcome that would have been obtained, had costs not 
impeded market operation.47 Its efficient legal doctrines make state intervention through 
statutory regulation unnecessary, especially since the legislative process does not have the 
means to produce efficient results, whether these means are the party's choice between 
settlement and adjudication,48 an evolutionary mechanism, driven by the utility-maximising 
decisions of litigants,49 or the utility function of judges as determined by the institutional 
structure of the adjudicative system.50 In short, the decentralised decision making of the free, 
self-correcting market generates efficiency. If market failure occurs, it is sufficient to rely on 
the common law to bring about the efficient outcome. 
 
Such a view, however, does not accord well with the mounting evidence suggesting an 
increasing regulatory role of private law. To be sure, this evidence suggests a diminishing 
importance of public regulation but, still implies that the market does not always function 
efficiently and that market failures need correction. It entails a trend from a command-and-
control to incentive-based regulation, not a trend toward deregulation as advocated by the 
Chicago school. It is evident that the origin of the market bias lies in the way Chicagoans 
construe the Coase lesson. In their view, the role of law should only be to define property 
rights and to assign them to the party who values them most since this would be the result from 
the market operation in the zero-transaction-cost world. Yet, as explained, such a laissez-faire 
attitude would lead to efficiency only if it actually brings about the ideal world, an outcome 
that is highly unlikely.51  
 
The source of market favouritism, however, can also be found in the natural law model of 
property rights which is at the basis of neoclassical economics. This is the model on which 
Adam Smith, defying mercantilism, grounded his theory of the invisible hand.52 Setting out to 
                                                 
46 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (First edn, Boston: Little, Brown 1972); George Priest, ‘The 
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Legal Rules’ (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 65; Paul 
Rubin, ‘Why Is the Common Law Efficient?’ (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 51; John Goodman, ‘An Economic 
Theory of the Evolution of Common Law’ (1982) 7 Journal of Legal Studies 393.  
47 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Fourth edn, Boston: Little, Brown 1992) 252.  
48 Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1; William Landes, 
‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’ (1971) 14 Journal of Law and Economics 61. 
49 Paul Rubin, ‘Why Is the Common Law Efficient?’ (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 51; George Priest, ‘The 
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Legal Rules’ (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 65. 
50 Richard Posner, ‘What Do Judges Maximise (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)’ (1993) 3 Supreme Court 
Economic Review 1. 
51 For such an argument, see also Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, ‘Labour Law and Economic Theory: A 
Reappraisal’ in Gerrit De Geest, Jacques Siegers and Roger van den Bergh (eds), Law and Economics and the 
Labour Market (First edn, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 1999); Simon Deakin, ‘Law versus Economics? 
Reflections on the Normative Foundations of Economic Activity’ in Megan Richardson and Gillian Hadfield (eds), 
The Second Wave of Law and Economics (First edn, Sydney: The Federation Press 1999). 
52 Smith's Wealth of the Nations was a reaction against the mercantilist policies dominating at the time. Under 
them the State, enacting many protectionist command-and-control regulations, became deeply involved in the 
economy. At that time the natural law framework was already introduced in England by Sir William Blackstone. 
William Blackstone, Sir, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1765-1769). In 
Smith's view, a property rights structure such as the one delineated in the natural law model, made the heavy 
government intervention, advocated by mercantilists, unnecessary, as the invisible hand of the free market would 
automatically channel the efforts of self-interested individuals toward socially desirable ends. Adam Smith, An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of the Nations (First edn, 1776), available at: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3300. For a more detailed interpretation of the historical context in which Adam 
Smith developed his invisible hand doctrine, see Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1997) 40-46. 
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formalise Smith's doctrine, the Chicago school embraced the natural law definition of property 
rights, implying a sovereign dominion of the individual, in which he or she is free from any 
government intervention and has an unrestricted bundle of rights over certain resources 
(property). Developed by civilian jurists, the natural law concept was divorced from the idea 
of obligation, necessary to control externalities, and any property right limitation was equated 
with limitation to freedom. Such absolute property rights were to be assigned by private law 
with any constraints contained only in public law regulation.53 This model remained largely 
an intellectual product and never underlay in its pure form the property rights structure in any 
legal system.54 Yet, it became the background against which mainstream law and economics 
developed its theory, placing great emphasis on the free market and perceiving any restraint 
on it as exogenously imposed.55  
 
Even after Coase had reconnected property rights and liability,56 mainstream economists did 
not re-examine the property right concept which continued to encompass a zone of "liberty 
over things" and to disregard the fact that in any legal system right-holders also have 
obligations.57 Searching for new methods to fill the void opened by Legal Realism58 many US 
legal scholars adopted economic insights without critically questioning them. Economic 
theoretical concepts were espoused without explicitly dispelling the natural law assumption, 
but as Coase had opened the door to real-world legal institutions, the analysis was directed to 
US law. Thus, the deregulation ideal backed by the natural law model, received a new support 
from the institutional structure of the American legal system which allots an important role to 
courts and much less faith in centralised decision-making. In this sense, the already existing 
misconception was not dismissed but another layer of confusion was added – the home country 
bias, the latter, as already explained rooted in unabandoned, tacitly operating legal positivist 
postulates.59  
 
Nevertheless, Coase's "The Problem of Social Cost" paved the way for a genuine shift in the 
way legal-economic analysis is carried out. Coase rejected the zero-transaction-cost world as 
an ideal place in which the absence of costs makes any institutions, even markets, useless.60   
                                                 
53 On the natural law model in civil law, see Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press 1997) 33-38. 
54 Although influential, the model was subsequently challenged and discarded by civil lawyers.  In the common 
law tradition, it found its way in scholarly writings, particularly in Blackstone's Commentaries, but was never 
adopted by common law judges. Consequently, it never infiltrated the very roots of the legal system. On the 
common law model, see Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press 1997) 39-40.  
55 For a more elaborate account of the natural law misconception in neoclassical economics, see Ugo Mattei, 
Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1997) Chapter 2 The 
Economist's Legacy to Law and Economics: The Natural Law Misconception in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective 27-67. 
56 Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
57 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (Sixth edn, Boston: Pearson Education, Inc. 2012) 73-74.  
58 On the disillusionment with law's autonomy caused by Legal Realism and the growth of numerous ''law and'…" 
movements as a search for means to re-legitimate law, see Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics 
and the Law. From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press 2006) 14-19. For a similar argument, see also Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 
(First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1997) 57.   
59 See supra Section B. For more on the home country bias underlying law and economics, see infra footnote 105 
and the text accompanying it. 
60 Ronald Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (First edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988) 7. 
"The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasean world. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. It is the world of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave." 
Ronald Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (First edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988) 174. 
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Bringing actual, existing law into the analysis, he made the first step of moving away from the 
natural law model, which is at the root of neoclassical economic theory. In addition, his 
account showed that along with the ex ante centralised model of regulation, the only one 
imagined by economists until then, there exists a functionally equivalent ex post decentralised 
model, operating through the imposition of remedies in private causes of action.61 Truly, the 
shift in the established paradigm turns out to be long and difficult since the Coase theorem 
continues to be misread as ruling out state intervention.62 One reason for this is that new 
institutionalists have not yet come up with a theory on the choice between public and private 
law.63 But they have made great progress in excavating the options of institutional control 
available in different contexts and retreating from the automatic universal recommendation 
that the market should be left to do its job.  
 
What makes NIE valuable for law and economics is its premise that the institutional 
framework, of which the legal framework is a part, matters for economic performance.64 
Institutions determine the level of transaction costs both at the micro-level of contracting 
between private parties and at the macro-level of the economy as a whole.65 When talking 
about efficient markets, the logic unfolds, economists already assume a complex set of 
institutions which on balance promote the efficient operation of the market.66 That is, the 
market is not efficient per se, its efficiency depends on the institutional structure, so 
improvement in economic performance requires investigation of the way different institutional 
frameworks enhance efficiency.67 In this analysis the optimal, though not perfect solution may 
be provided by whatever real-life arrangement is found to exist: ex ante or ex post; statutory 
law, judge-made law or private ordering; or any combination between them. In this sense, in 
the world of transaction costs, market solutions are only one of the possible alternatives among 
others, with the range of possibilities including command-and-control as well as responsive 
regulation.68 The superiority of any alternative can be claimed only after careful comparative 
institutional analysis revealing the pros and cons of each of the options.69  
 
                                                 
61 Later Williamson directed the attention also to private regulation. Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions 
of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (First edn, New York: Free Press, London: Collier 
Macmillan 1985). 
62 Cooter called the confusion about the generalisations which follow from the Coase theorem "the cost of Coase". 
Robert Cooter, ‘The Cost of Coase’ (1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
63 Thomas Ulen, ‘The Future of Law and Economics’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano (eds), 
Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions (First edn, London and New York: Routledge 2007) 33. 
64 Institutions constitute "the rules of the game in a society", they are "the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction" by structuring "incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic". Douglass 
North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance (First edn, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1990) 3. 
65 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance (First edn, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1990) 61-69. 
66 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance (First edn, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1990) 64-66. 
67 See also for such an understanding of the NIE theory Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and 
the Law. From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press 2006) 241-245. 
68 For such an interpretation of the Coase theorem see Deakin, ‘Law versus Economics? Reflections on the 
Normative Foundations of Economic Activity’; Deakin and Wilkinson, ‘Labour Law and Economic Theory: A 
Reappraisal’. 
69 In this respect Coase was most explicit. See Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The Journal 
of Law and Economics 1, 18-19; Ronald Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (First edn, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press 1988) 117-118; Ronald Coase, ‘Law and Economics and A. W. Brian Simpson’ (1996) 25 Journal 
of Legal Studies 103. 
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Divorced from the market, efficiency becomes a theoretical concept dependent on the 
particular institutional context. With law being a vital part of this context,70 a legal researcher 
may proceed with her mind clear and eyes wide open about comparing different legal 
institutions in different jurisdictions. Just as there is not one single efficient solution, it cannot 
be said from the outset which country's legal institutions are more efficient. Such a conclusion 
requires in-depth examination of the types of transaction costs generated by the legal-
economic environment in each jurisdiction. What is more, as efficiency no longer constitutes 
an absolute yardstick for comparison, recommendations will probably differ with regard to 
each of the countries on a case by case basis. Thus, the greater subtlety of positive institutional 
analysis will most probably lead to more responsive and tailored normative prescriptions.71 
 
3. The Dynamism of the Framework  
 
Chicago legal-economic analysis is remarkably static.72 With models omitting the dynamics 
of the economic and the legal system, neoclassical theory is able to draw a picture concerning 
only a particular point of time. Relying solely on an ex ante comparison between the costs and 
benefits of the introduction of a rule, the Coase model also misses the dimension of legal-
economic change. Thus, for example, a legal rule compensating externalities may preclude the 
rise of welfare-enhancing business in the short run, but in the long run it may encourage 
competitors to search for innovative, less harmful ways of production, thus actually increasing 
well-being.73 Trying to develop a long term vision, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Chicago school 
advanced a hypothesis which saw the development of common law as a steady evolution 
                                                 
70 Institutions include formal rules (constitutions, laws, regulations) and informal constraints (conventions, norms 
of behaviour, self-imposed codes of conduct). Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic 
Performance (First edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990) 4. 
71 This account of the advantages of NIE, of course, does not mean that all research, which builds on the claim that 
institutions matter and uses inter-jurisdictional comparative analysis of legal institutions, automatically avoids all 
theoretical and methodological problems. Thus, the studies associated with the New Comparative Economics 
school have been subjected to fierce criticism from the legal community. Using statistical methods, the Legal 
Origins strand of New Comparative Economics seeks to assert a clear link between the origins of a jurisdiction's 
legal system, on one side, and, on the other side, the content and enforcement of its legal rules, as well as its 
economic performance. The large-scale studies offer far-reaching conclusions that do not discriminate between 
origin and recipient countries or between the ways in which legal transplantation has taken place (involuntary 
imposition, voluntary emulation, etc.). That is, although on the face the Legal Origins theory recognises the 
importance of institutions for economic growth, it seems to proceed on the basis of the assumption that the 
disparate institutional environment makes no difference with regard to the effects of transplanted legal institutions. 
The Institutional Possibilities Frontier strand of the same school also does not engage in a disciplined comparative 
institutional analysis. It does not analyse the pros and cons of judge-made law, self-regulation and market solutions 
in developing countries but refers only to the disadvantages of public regulation, jumping to the conclusion that 
efficiency requires developing jurisdictions to employ less regulation. In this sense and for a more detailed 
methodological critique of New Comparative Economics, see Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, ‘Toward an 
Institutional Approach to Comparative Economic Law’ in Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt and Joakim Nergelius 
(eds), New Directions in Comparative Law (First edn, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2009). For studies from the 
Legal Origins strand, see Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 Journal 
of Finance 1131; Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113; 
Rafael La Porta and others, ‘The Quality of Government’ (1999) 15 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 
222; Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’ (2004) 112 Journal of Political Economy 445. 
For studies from the Institutional Possibilities Frontier strand, see Simeon Djankov and others, ‘The New 
Comparative Economics’ (2003) 31 Journal of Comparative Economics 595.  
72 Coase regrets that the static framework of neoclassical economics never underwent the transformation 
experienced by evolutionary biology after Darwin, though for his theory he had also drawn inspiration from Adam 
Smith.  Ronald Coase, ‘The New Institutional Economics’ (1998) 88 The American Economic Review 72. 
73 Stefan Grundmann, Kapitel 3 ‘Privatrecht und (Institutionen-) Ökonomik’ in Stefan Grundmann, Hans-W. 
Micklitz and Moritz Renner, Privatrechtstheorie (First edn, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2015).  
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toward efficiency.74 However, empirical time-series studies have already produced evidence 
contradicting this hypothesis in the commercial area.75 
 
With regard to the development of a dynamic theory, NIE has set foot on much firmer ground. 
The theory is built on a model of institutional change, which new institutionalists see primarily 
as an incremental process, though change in a discontinuous manner is not excluded.76 In the 
model, law is no longer some exogenous, human addition to the market, the latter appearing as 
an ever-existing divine creation. On the contrary, both law and the market are institutions 
which, set in a larger and complex institutional environment, evolve together, each exerting 
pressure on the other and affecting its development.77 In contrast with the neoclassical vision 
which pictures a relentless advancement toward a stable efficient equilibrium, new 
institutionalists tell a much more sophisticated story of change, in which convergence and 
divergence emerge in a complex fashion. While North does not deny that some convergence 
can be observed within the Western industrial world, he shows convincingly that, even in this 
case, national stories of evolution diverge, with the gap growing sharply when the analysis is 
extended beyond these limits.78 He explains the general process of convergence as a movement 
toward efficiency. Yet, he acknowledges simultaneously that worldwide inefficient property 
rights structures abound (with competitive pressures not eliminating them) and societies vary 
greatly in their economic performance. He rationalises this – from the mainstream viewpoint – 
puzzling observation with the constraining nature of institutions, which condition organisations' 
choices, incentivising behaviour that in fact perpetuates the existing institutional structure. The 
way to understand the process of institutional stability and change as well as the 
convergent/divergent evolution of institutions across jurisdictions is to retrace the historical 
context in which national institutional matrices have grown.79  
 
North's observations on convergence and divergence between countries' economic performance 
are consistent with the convergence/divergence tendencies perceived by comparative lawyers. 
Rethinking comparative law classifications, more and more often they emphasise the so-called 
Western legal tradition, which, despite the important differences between the encompassed 
                                                 
74 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Fourth edn, Boston: Little, Brown 1992); see also George Priest, 
‘The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Legal Rules’ (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 65; Paul 
Rubin, ‘Why Is the Common Law Efficient?’ (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 51.  
75 For example, a study based on a data set of 461 US state court appellate decisions, issued from 1970 to 2005 
and involving the economic loss rule in construction disputes, the law did not converge to any stable resting point 
and evolved differently in different states. See Anthony Niblett, Richard Posner and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The 
Evolution of a Legal Rule’ (2010) 39 Journal of Legal Studies 325.  
76 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (First edn, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1990) 6. 
77 The use of institutional theory by New Comparative Economics is flawed in this respect too. In the studies of 
the Legal Origins strand, legal origin is viewed as exogenous – transplanted through conquest or colonisation. 
Under the assumption that the development of a legal system cannot be shaped by a country's political and 
economic environment, legal origin is used as an instrumental variable to test the claim that legal rules 
systematically affect economic performance. The questionable rigid exogeneity of legal systems and the omission 
of changes in legal rules over time make extremely problematic any decisive conclusions about an existing 
consistent causal relationship between the common law/civil law distinction and economic outcomes. See John 
Armour and others, ‘Law and Financial Development: What Are We Learning from Time-Series Evidence’ (2009) 
2009 Brigham Young University Law Review 1435. 
78 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance (First edn, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1990) 6, 130. 
79 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance (First edn, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1990) Preface, 6-7, 73-82. 
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common law and civil law jurisdictions, is considered roughly homogeneous.80 NIE forces 
lawyers to recognise that introducing a new legal solution means expending scarce resources 
and thus debunks any traces of economic nirvana that may be left in comparative law.81 But 
what is more important, by exploring the kind of conditions that account for institutional change 
toward (in)efficiency across time, the historical branch of the New Institutional school can 
greatly enrich comparative research on legal transplants.82 This is important considering that 
despite having collected abundant evidence on the occurrence of legal change, comparativists 
know very little about its causal factors, to which they continue to refer only by the vague notion 
of prestige.83  
 
In examining history, the concepts of path dependency and institutional complementarity 
become crucial for understanding long-run legal and economic change. The increasing returns 
of past institutional choices underpin the evolution of legal institutions and markets on a 
particular path and reversal of direction often comes only through changes in the polity or 
technological shocks.84 From this perspective, the very mode of change (e.g. choice of 
regulation by contract law or by administrative intervention) may be determined by a strong 
path dependency. On one hand, such dependency enables predictions about the probable 
response of a legal system to a new challenge in conditions of continuity; on the other hand, it 
influences the effects generated by a new legal rule in a particular jurisdiction.85 In addition, 
the choice of one type of institutional arrangement in the economic domain makes a 
corresponding institution viable in the legal domain and vice versa. Such institutional 
complementarities create the possibility for multiple self-perpetuating equilibria, all of which 
                                                 
80 Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1997) 
95, 224-226; Pier Giuseppe Monateri, ‘Methods in Comparative Law: an Intellectual Overview’ in Pier Giuseppe 
Monateri (ed), Methods of Comparative Law (First edn, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 10. 
81 It has been asserted that the positivistic perspective of domestic lawyers is supported by the neoclassical 
economic nirvana, in which consistency of the hierarchical system of legal norms, is achieved without any 
limitations on rationality and transaction costs. Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano, ‘Law and Economics in 
Retrospect’ in Éric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant (eds), New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook (First 
edn, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press 2008); Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo 
Pagano, ‘Law, Economics, and Institutional Complexity. An Introduction’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and 
Ugo Pagano (eds), Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions (First edn, London and New York: Routledge 2007) 
1-2. The comparative scholarship on legal irritants and legal fragmentation, however, implies some understanding 
of the constraints, termed by economists as transaction costs and bounded rationality. Günther Teubner, ‘Legal 
Irritants: Good Faith in British Law, or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences’ in Francis Snyder (ed), 
The Europeanisation of Law: the Legal Effects of European Integration (First edn, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2000). 
Yet, to the extent some lawyers still automatically equate borrowing and harmonisation with the introduction of 
the "best" solution, even comparative analysis has not completely broken free from economic nirvana assumptions. 
82 New Comparative Economics is convincingly criticised with respect to the necessary conditions it identified for 
successful legal change. It has been submitted that the effect of transplanted legal solutions is determined to a 
greater extent by the degree of their domestication, achieved in the receiving country, rather than by the legal 
family from which they were borrowed. Daniel Berkowitz, Katarina Pistor and Jean-François Richard, ‘Economic 
Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 European Economic Review 165; Daniel Berkowitz, 
Katarina Pistor and Richard Jean-François, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 163. 
83 In this sense, see Alan Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37 Cambridge Law Journal 313, 
320; Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’ (1991) 39 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 343, 398; Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press 1997) 123-125; 127-128. 
84 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance (First edn, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1990) 112. 
85 Ugo Mattei and Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ in Peter Newman (ed), New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol 1 (London: Macmillan Reference 1998) 348-349. 
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may be equally optimal, but may also result in a Pareto-inferior outcome.86  Therefore, 
convergence of legal systems toward efficiency is possible but in no way guaranteed. 
Divergences may mean inefficiencies but this is not necessarily so.87 Different equally efficient 
or inefficient development trajectories are feasible. Thus, emphasising the local historical 
conditions and the interdependence between the legal and economic domains, NIE rejects the 
universal evolutionary path of law envisaged by the Chicago school. Instead, it provides a 
framework to analyse legal change which allows for a trend of convergence but also accounts 
for the diversity of national laws and for the dissimilar ways transplanted legal solutions play 
out in different legal systems.88  
 
In summary, the different analytical procedure, the view of the market as not efficient in itself 
and the development of convincing theoretical explanation of change over time constitute real 
methodological differences between the Chicago school and NIE which ultimately translate 
into a different stance with regard to the concept of efficiency. In neoclassical theory efficiency 
is understood as the ideal solution in the Kaldor-Hicks sense, which can be brought about by 
the free market and with which common law comports. NIE, on the other hand, does not have 
such an absolute view of efficiency. It is not obsessed with the idea of devising the ideal 
solution. It rather looks for the second-best but feasible solution which is to be chosen from 
the set of identified, functionally equivalent alternatives according to the level and types of 
transaction costs. Transaction costs themselves depend on the institutional environment in 
which the alternative options are embedded.89 Efficiency, thus, becomes a relative, dynamic 
notion, not equated with the unique, optimal state of the world to which law, in the Chicagoan 
vision, is bound to converge in the long run. Efficiency is contingent on the institutional 
framework, the latter in turn determined by the historical path on which it has evolved.  
 
It is this context-dependent, dynamic concept of efficiency embraced by comparative law and 
economics90 that lays the foundation of refined, empirically relevant economic analysis. Such 
understanding of efficiency implies that for the same legal problem one contract remedy may 
turn out to be efficient in one legal system and inefficient in another or that different contract 
remedies may prove to be equally efficient in different national laws.91 Consequently, with 
regard to any normative recommendations, efficiency is viewed as a category which is to be 
pursued in different ways in the different legal systems.92 Having clarified the choice of 
economic methodology and the controversial issue of efficiency from a theoretical perspective, 
                                                 
86 Masahiko Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (First edn, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: 
MIT Press 2001). For a formal definition of institutional complementarity, see Ugo Pagano, ‘Legal Positions and 
Institutional Complementarities’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano (eds), Legal Orderings and 
Economic Institutions (First edn, London and New York: Routledge 2005) 65-66. 
87 In the same sense, see Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press 1997) 129, 133-134. 
88 See in this sense Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano, ‘Law and Economics in Retrospect’ in Éric Brousseau and 
Jean-Michel Glachant (eds), New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook (First edn, Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press 2008). 
89 Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (First edn, New York: Oxford University Press 1996). 
90 Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1997); 
Ugo Mattei and Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ in Peter Newman (ed), New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol 1 (London: Macmillan Reference 1998). 
91 Paraphrased from Ugo Mattei and Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ in Peter Newman (ed), 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol 1 (London: Macmillan Reference 1998) 347. See in the 
same sense Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press 1997) 133-134. 
92 In a similar sense, see Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press 1997) 22. 
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I now turn to the important role of Comparative Law in the proposed interdisciplinary 
approach. 
 
D. The Role of Comparative Law 
 
As both NIE and Comparative Law employ the comparative technique and the functional 
method of comparison, they naturally merge in the Comparative Law and Economics 
approach. In the past comparative lawyers have often slipped into merely descriptive exercises 
in which they observe similarities and differences between legal systems without providing 
convincing theoretical explanations for them. From this point of view, comparative law can 
gain from the mature economic framework, providing it with a possibility to rationalise better 
the empirical data as well as to measure more accurately the common core and the 
dissimilarities between national laws.93 Also, unlike lawyers in the common law tradition, who 
master inductive analysis, economists tend to engage in deductive thinking: on the basis of 
certain assumptions they construct models which they then test against empirical data in order 
to draw conclusions.94 In this sense, legal scholars can benefit from economic reasoning which 
forces them to understand and make explicit their own systemic assumptions about law. No 
doubt, starting from abstract legal norms and overarching principles, civil lawyers are 
accustomed to deductive analysis.95 This, however, does not mean that they are proficient in 
spelling out their premises. On the contrary, largely determined by legal tradition, these 
premises are often taken for granted and thus remain tacit in the reasoning of civil lawyers. In 
addition, the increase in technical legislation as well as in the standing of the judiciary 
progressively stimulates inductive legal thinking in civil law jurisdictions. Thus, continental 
legal scholars can also learn lessons from economists in clarifying their presuppositions when 
searching for the correct answer to a problem. 
 
Economic analysis enriches comparative law; yet, the latter's contribution to law and 
economics should also not be underestimated. Comparative law provides abundant empirical 
data, thus enhancing realism in economic analysis. It has accumulated rich knowledge about 
the legal orders integrating the different legal solutions and, hence, of the variables affecting 
transaction costs. Last but not least, comparative law surmounts the difficulties arising from 
the different source-of-law structure in common law and civil law legal systems. 
 
1. Abundant Empirical Material 
 
Comparative law contributes an inexhaustible pool of alternative legal solutions to economic 
problems, making economics less abstract, more engaged with the real world and 
simultaneously more capable of generalising about the working of law, not as local background 
but as universal social phenomenon.96  
                                                 
93 In this sense, see Ugo Mattei and Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ in Peter Newman (ed), 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol 1 (London: Macmillan Reference 1998) 346-347; Ugo 
Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1997) 97, 124-
125. 
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Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2006) 41-43.  
95 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Third rev. edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press; 
New York: Oxford University Press 1998) 69. 
96 In this sense, see Ugo Mattei and Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ in Peter Newman (ed), 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol 1 (London: Macmillan Reference 1998) 346, 348; Ugo 




Opening the door to an abundant variety of existing property rights structures, none of which 
matches the natural law model, comparative law shows the necessity of moving beyond the 
unrealistic template on which mainstream law and economics bases its analysis.97 
Appreciation of the wide range of "jural relations" (rights, liberties, powers, immunities, 
duties, liabilities and disabilities)98 will enable better understanding of the reasons for which 
legal systems have different combinations of remedies, allow greater or lesser leeway for 
judges in awarding them and employ a different model (centralised or decentralised) for 
remedial distribution.99  
 
Merger with comparative law is also about surpassing the wisdom received from NIE. The 
economic nirvana of zero transaction costs,100 which new institutionalists manage to 
overcome, depends on a "legal nirvana",101 sustained by the Kelsenian view of law as a united, 
hierarchical system of legal norms, whose frictionless consistency is derived from the authority 
of one single source.102 This legal nirvana has not yet faded away in new institutional research 
as the latter continues to assume well-defined, tradable property rights over all valued 
attributes of goods and services, for which rights there always exists a market and an 
enforcement system, producing efficient resolution to economic conflicts.103 New 
institutionalist economists take the system of setting and enforcing property rights as given. In 
their analysis, the interrelationship between transaction governance and law does not affect the 
level of transaction costs.104 This is another reason why, the conjugation with comparative law 
can be especially insightful. With its interest in many, simultaneously valid legal orders 
comparative law naturally rejects the legal nirvana. In one stroke, it also cures the home 
country bias, inherited from American legal scholars working in law and economics.105 The 
                                                 
97 On the natural law misconception of neoclassical law and economics, see supra the text accompanying footnotes 
52-55.  
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99 Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1997) 
58, 63-67. 
100 On the economic nirvana of Chicago law and economics, see supra Section C.1. 
101 Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano, ‘Law and Economics in Retrospect’ in Éric Brousseau and Jean-Michel 
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102 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russel and Russel 1961). 
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ample variety of legal arrangements brought in by comparative law in a way confirms not only 
their importance for determining the ex ante and ex post transaction costs but also the problem 
of using one single legal system as a basis for drawing fundamental conclusions on the effect 
of legal institutions. 
 
2. Knowledge of the Legal Systems in Which Legal Rules are Embedded 
 
Economic tools can be applied to any legal system. It is a matter of comparative knowledge, 
not of a priori economic impotence, to factor the different legal solutions across jurisdictions 
in the analysis. The functional method106 allows comparativists to pierce the legal systems' 
doctrinal veil, which obstructs understanding of the way legal rules operate. Carried out on the 
basis of factual scenarios, functional comparison ignores the conceptual disparities between 
national laws and identifies the applicable legal rules solving the same problems in each legal 
system. Such a functional exercise enables, for example, detection of similarities and 
differences across jurisdictions regarding the available type of remedy and the calculation of 
damages. It can also penetrate possible differences in legal taxonomies such as contract/tort, 
public/private law in order to analyse the effect of legal rules on individual behaviour. Yet, the 
transaction cost analysis will be impoverished if the work remains at the stage of functional 
comparison and completely disregards the differences in juridical conceptual frameworks.107 
Once the legal solutions that are functional substitutes across jurisdictions are identified, the 
relative efficiency of each of them will become clear only by juxtaposing them within the 
context of each of the selected legal systems. At this point the specific taxonomic and 
conceptual structures become important again since they can turn out to be sources of 
transaction costs that have to be taken into consideration.  
 
Comparative law has accumulated a tremendous amount of knowledge that can help in 
distinguishing the real and imagined differences between common law and civil law countries, 
between the US and European jurisdictions, and between the different systems on the 
Continent. It has much to say about the diverse legal traditions and the possible hurdles 
generated by them that may preclude legal change in the direction of efficiency.108 Translated 
into economic terminology such hurdles constitute ex ante transaction costs in the definition 
of property rights, an issue on which economic analysis has made very little progress.109 
Comparative law can also explain the reasons for which functionally equivalent legal solutions 
may prove to be grounded in contract in one legal system and in tort in another. It can 
illuminate the diverse allocation of institutional roles across jurisdictions and thus justify the 
different weight attributed to private law and public law mechanisms. The different nature of 
the legal arrangements and the transaction costs imposed by legal tradition may suggest a 
                                                 
Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1997) Chapter 3 The 
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106 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Third rev. edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press; 
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108 Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1997) 
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109 In this sense, see Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano, ‘Law, Economics, and Institutional 
Complexity. An Introduction’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano (eds), Legal Orderings and 
Economic Institutions (First edn, London and New York: Routledge 2007) 6. 
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modification within the existing legal solution without changing its assignment between 
different fields (e.g. contract or tort, private or public law).110 Comparative research also 
implies that the development of a legal system may strongly depend on the degree of influence 
of the professional groups framing the law in the different legal contexts. Hence, determined 
by factors such as power and authority, the evolution of the legal system may not necessarily 
entail reductions in transaction costs.111 All these are matters which must be investigated 
contextually. However, what needs to be emphasised at this stage is that comparative law has 
methodology for deconstruction of the declared legal rules as well as for deep-level 
examination of the context-dependent conceptual framework.112 Both are vital for making a 
sound economic analysis. 
  
3. Bridging Source-of-Law Differences 
 
While enabling economic analysis to account for local particularities, comparative law is also 
able to bridge the common law/civil law divide where the latter is irrelevant for law and 
economics. Nowhere is this more evident than in the question of the sources of law recognised 
in common law and civil law jurisdictions. 
 
According to traditional accounts, the source-of-law structure is a key difference between 
common law and civil law systems: the former mostly based on judge-made law, applied 
according to the rule of precedent, while the latter - grounded on statutory law, interpreted by 
courts. Superficially this raises a problem – where law and economics focuses predominantly 
on case-law, the analysis can be attacked as unconvincing. After all, even if having some 
influence in legal reality, case-law in civil law systems is not setting out binding legal rules. 
Thus, the absence of a rule of precedent gives rise to concerns over whether the economic 
approach is at all fit to be applied to civil law. Clearly such a view is the legacy of the positivist 
conceptions of law, ignoring the latest achievements of comparative law methodology.113  
 
Inherently anti-positivist in nature, comparative law has long passed the point of juxtaposing 
only the legislative texts of European continental legal systems, struggling with the 
phenomenon of uncodified common law. The focus on law in action has opened new lines of 
enquiry revealing that the similarities between the two legal traditions are more than previously 
assumed. Comparativists repeatedly emphasise that throughout the 20th century the common 
law/civil law differences in the source-of-law structure have been softened with the two legal 
traditions experiencing a process of convergence. It has long been maintained that common 
law courts live in "the age of statutes",114 while legislators in civil law jurisdictions face the 
reality of increasing case-law impact on the legal system. The role of civil law judges is hardly 
exhausted with being the "mouthpiece of statutory law", as declared by Montesquieu. Rather, 
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they have their own lawmaking contributions. Examples can be identified not only from the 
jurisdictions that have supplied the grand civil codes (France and Germany) as is usually done, 
but also from lesser known civil law countries such as Bulgaria. Bulgarian courts have 
developed important issues of the regime of damages for breach of contract, of the contract for 
the benefit of third parties, the contract for transfer of property in exchange of care and 
maintenance. The court decisions in the area of preliminary contracts have even prompted 
amendments to the relevant statutory provisions.115 But even where case-law has not led to 
statutory amendments, civil law judges participate in lawmaking. Undoubtedly, in all civil law 
systems the broad standards used abundantly in the legislative acts (“the reasonable man”, 
etc.), actually increase the importance of case-law, as judges are charged with the task of giving 
these broad concepts a concrete meaning. And where civil codes cannot keep pace with 
modern life, judges fill the gaps adapting the law to contemporary reality and thus developing 
it normatively. All the amassed comparative experience shows that the differences with regard 
to the source-of-law structure between civil law and common law were exaggerated and do 
not preclude economic analysis. 
 
When addressing the different structure of sources of law, comparative law does not stop with 
the identification of the trend of convergence between civil law and common law systems. 
Acknowledging the changing social reality and in an effort to capture law in action, the most 
recent comparative theory maintains that a specific legal rule cannot be ascertained merely by 
consulting the source of law (legislation or case-law), endorsed by the national definition of 
the term. A legal rule is rather a product of the interaction of different "legal formants" (court 
decisions, legislative acts, scholarly works), each of which contributes to shaping the rule.116 
Thus, finding the rule requires consultation of many different texts, written by different 
suppliers of law, which may very well contradict and challenge each other. The role of the 
comparative lawyer then is to discover by analyzing all these texts not the rule in force, but 
the true operational rule in the legal system as well as the various factors and influences that 
led to it. Resolving in this way the puzzle with the different source-of-law structure, 
comparative law not only manages to overcome the gap between common law and civil law 
systems and to establish itself as one of the most promising legal disciplines. It also makes it 
possible to perform an economic analysis which accounts for the dissimilarities between the 
different legal traditions and simultaneously bridges them in order to examine them from a 
common analytical perspective.117 
 
In other words, just as neoclassical economics is not the mandatory economic approach, 
American law (or another common law legal system) does not constitute an obligatory 
background for economic research. Contributing ample empirical material and accrued 
knowledge of different institutional environments, comparative law opens the economic 
perspective to the peculiarities of various national contexts. At the same time refuting the 
natural law and positive law assumptions that still underlie economic theory and solving 
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concrete methodological problems (as in the source-of-law example), comparative law aids 
law and economics in its universalistic aspirations. 
 
The final requirement for a good method for “doing” law and economics is for reciprocity. 
Adding the insights from another discipline – economics – opens new horizons to legal 
research and infuses it with new analytical energy. Yet, true interdisciplinarity cannot be 
achieved where economics (as in the case of neoclassical economics) subjugates law and treats 
it only as an object of research without allowing for the deep internal links between the two 
disciplines. Interdisciplinary interaction makes sense only if the approaches are combined in a 
way to enhance each other and create a new, blended method of increased power and insight. 
On this account, comparative institutional law and economics is a remarkably promising 
marriage between two methodologies of two different disciplines. Both inherently comparative 
and historical, NIE and comparative law naturally complement each other, curing each other's 
weaknesses. In the resulting rich framework, efficiency ceases to be a universal benchmark 
against which all legal systems are measured and acquires meaning only within the 
institutional environment of a particular jurisdiction. Capable of such deep-level studying of 
national legal systems, comparative law and economics can then produce a unifying theory of 
law as a universal social phenomenon. It is only regrettable that until now this new 




This paper makes several contributions. The first is modest – it exposes to the legal audience 
of this journal the availability of a different kind of economics, one that is not so common, yet 
that is sufficiently well-developed to make important contributions to the analysis of a number 
of legal phenomena. What is more, it was shown that NIE does not suffer from the shortcomings 
of the neoclassical approach that make the latter unpalatable for many lawyers. The more 
ambitious contribution is to propose a development of the NIE method. I have shown that while 
NIE represents an improved alternative to neoclassical economics, by itself it is not 
epistemically satisfactory either. Its own limitations, however, do not make it redundant when 
applied to law. On the contrary, I have shown that it is a natural partner to Comparative Law. 
NIE can form an equal partnership with Comparative Law – Comparative Institutional Law and 
Economics as I called it – which promises to be very fruitful both for economics and for law. 
This will be especially valuable for those of us who want to study law in the full richness of its 
social context. While socio-legal studies are increasingly popular in academia,law and 
economics is conspicuously absent from this ‘socio’, as if economics were not a social science. 
Thus, the furthest reaching goal of this paper is not only to show a proper way to do law and 
economics, but also to put economics back on the broad palette of socio-legal scholarship.  
 
The final contribution which I claim is to have rescued the concept of efficiency from the grip 
of neoclassical economics. Instead of the universal yardstick that enables the economists to pass 
judgements on rules, institutions and legal systems that they rarely bother to fully understand, 
Comparative Institutional Law and Economics uses a concept that is dependent on the context. 
While it allows meaningful comparisons between different institutions within jurisdiction, or 
between alternative institutions across jurisdictions, it eschews the urge to rank them according 
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